Typographic Attacks in a Multi-Image Setting
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are susceptible to typographic attacks, which are misclassifications caused by an attack text that is added to an image. In this paper, we introduce a multi-image setting for studying typographic attacks, broadening the current emphasis of the literature on attacking individual images. Specifically, our focus is on attacking image sets without repeating the attack query. Such non-repeating attacks are stealthier, as they are more likely to evade a gatekeeper than attacks that repeat the same attack text. We introduce two attack strategies for the multi-image setting, leveraging the difficulty of the target image, the strength of the attack text, and text-image similarity. Our text-image similarity approach improves attack success rates by 21% over random, non-specific methods on the CLIP model using ImageNet while maintaining stealth in a multi-image scenario. An additional experiment demonstrates transferability, i.e., text-image similarity calculated using CLIP transfers when attacking InstructBLIP.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 7.
8 papers.
- 2025Exploring Typographic Visual Prompts Injection Threats in Cross-Modality Generation Modelscited by 12
- 2026Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Modelscited by 3
- 2026Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training: Robustifying Multimodal Web Agents Against Cross-Modal Attackscited by 1
- 2026Reading Between the Pixels: Linking Text-Image Embedding Alignment to Typographic Attack Success on Vision-Language Modelscited by 1
- 2026Seeing Through Circuits: Faithful Mechanistic Interpretability for Vision Transformerscited by 1
- 2026Mosaic: Multimodal Jailbreak against Closed-Source VLMs via Multi-View Ensemble Optimizationcited by 0
- 2026One Perturbation, Two Failure Modes: Probing VLM Safety via Embedding-Guided Typographic Perturbationscited by 0
- 2026Towards Robustness against Typographic Attack with Training-free Concept Localizationcited by 0
- 2026Towards Robustness against Typographic Attack with Training-free Concept Localization2 Jul 2026
- 2026One Perturbation, Two Failure Modes: Probing VLM Safety via Embedding-Guided Typographic Perturbations28 Apr 2026
- 2026Seeing Through Circuits: Faithful Mechanistic Interpretability for Vision Transformers15 Apr 2026
- 2026Reading Between the Pixels: Linking Text-Image Embedding Alignment to Typographic Attack Success on Vision-Language Models14 Apr 2026
- 2026Mosaic: Multimodal Jailbreak against Closed-Source VLMs via Multi-View Ensemble Optimization10 Apr 2026
- 2026Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training: Robustifying Multimodal Web Agents Against Cross-Modal Attacks4 Mar 2026
- 2026Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models24 Jan 2026
- 2025Exploring Typographic Visual Prompts Injection Threats in Cross-Modality Generation Models14 Mar 2025