MARAGE: Transferable Multi-Model Adversarial Attack for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Data Extraction
On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG
Abstract (arXiv)
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) offers a solution to mitigate hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their outputs to knowledge retrieved from external sources. The use of private resources and data in constructing these external data stores can expose them to risks of extraction attacks, in which attackers attempt to steal data from these private databases. Existing RAG extraction attacks often rely on manually crafted prompts, which limit their effectiveness. In this paper, we introduce a framework called MARAGE for optimizing an adversarial string that, when appended to user queries submitted to a target RAG system, causes outputs containing the retrieved RAG data verbatim. MARAGE leverages a continuous optimization scheme that integrates gradients from multiple models with different architectures simultaneously to enhance the transferability of the optimized string to unseen models. Additionally, we propose a strategy that emphasizes the initial tokens in the target RAG data, further improving the attack's generalizability. Evaluations show that MARAGE consistently outperforms both manual and optimization-based baselines across multiple LLMs and RAG datasets, while maintaining robust transferability to previously unseen models. Moreover, we conduct probing tasks to shed light on the reasons why MARAGE is more effective compared to the baselines and to analyze the impact of our approach on the model's internal state.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 0 of its 60 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
3 papers.
- 2026CIPL: A Channel-Aware Framework for Recoverable Privacy Leakage in LLM Agents18 Sep 2026
- 2025ReliabilityRAG: Effective and Provably Robust Defense for RAG-based Web-Search27 Sep 2025
- 2025One Pic is All it Takes: Poisoning Visual Document Retrieval Augmented Generation with a Single Image2 Apr 2025
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- 2025CPA-RAG:Covert Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models
- 2024Towards More Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Evaluating RAG Under Adversarial Poisoning Attacks
- 2024BadRAG: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
- 2026Towards Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Comprehensive Review of Threats, Defenses and Benchmarks
- 2024Follow My Instruction and Spill the Beans: Scalable Data Extraction from Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
- 2026PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
- 2024On the Vulnerability of Applying Retrieval-Augmented Generation within Knowledge-Intensive Application Domains