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Optimal bounds for dissatisfaction in perpetual voting

arXiv 2501.01969 ↗First posted 20 Dec 2024cs.GT cs.AI cs.LGcited by 2

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Abstract (arXiv)

In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider the following question: is there a perpetual approval voting method that guarantees that no voter is dissatisfied too many times? We identify a sufficient condition on voter behavior -- which we call 'bounded conflicts' condition -- under which a sublinear growth of dissatisfaction is possible. We provide a tight upper bound on the growth of dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, using techniques from Kolmogorov complexity. We also observe that the approval voting with binary choices mimics the machine learning setting of prediction with expert advice. This allows us to present a voting method with sublinear guarantees on dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, based on the standard techniques from prediction with expert advice.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 1 of its 8 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Dec 2024.

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1 of 8 references.

References · 1

  1. 2024Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionalitycited by 11

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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.

2 papers.