mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

An Empirical Analysis of Federated Learning Models Subject to Label-Flipping Adversarial Attack

arXiv 2412.18507 ↗First posted 24 Dec 2024cs.LGcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper, we empirically analyze adversarial attacks on selected federated learning models. The specific learning models considered are Multinominal Logistic Regression (MLR), Support Vector Classifier (SVC), Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Convolution Neural Network (CNN), %Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Random Forest, XGBoost, and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). For each model, we simulate label-flipping attacks, experimenting extensively with 10 federated clients and 100 federated clients. We vary the percentage of adversarial clients from 10% to 100% and, simultaneously, the percentage of labels flipped by each adversarial client is also varied from 10% to 100%. Among other results, we find that models differ in their inherent robustness to the two vectors in our label-flipping attack, i.e., the percentage of adversarial clients, and the percentage of labels flipped by each adversarial client. We discuss the potential practical implications of our results.

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References · 7

  1. 2016Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Datacited by 7,669
  2. 2016XGBoost: A Scalable Tree Boosting Systemcited by 5,166
  3. 2020Flower: A Friendly Federated Learning Research Frameworkcited by 455
  4. 2020Data Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning Systemscited by 275
  5. 2022Survey on Federated Learning Threats: concepts, taxonomy on attacks and defences, experimental study and challengescited by 84
  6. 2022Defending against the Label-flipping Attack in Federated Learningcited by 16
  7. 2022Federated Learning Attacks and Defenses: A Surveycited by 12

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