mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Breaking ReAct Agents: Foot-in-the-Door Attack Will Get You In

arXiv 2410.16950 ↗First posted 22 Oct 2024cs.CR cs.AIcited by 21

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Key facts. Cited by 21 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 17 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Oct 2024.

Builds on

17 of 23 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  2. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 15

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  2. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  4. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  6. 2023Large Language Models Cannot Self-Correct Reasoning Yetcited by 965
  7. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  8. 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 568
  9. 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 364
  10. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 237
  11. 2023OpenAGI: When LLM Meets Domain Expertscited by 196
  12. 2023Survey of Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models Revealed by Adversarial Attackscited by 189
3 more
  1. 2024Coercing LLMs to do and reveal (almost) anythingcited by 88
  2. 2024Operationalizing a Threat Model for Red-Teaming Large Language Models (LLMs)cited by 44
  3. 2024Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)cited by 5

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 13; 2026: 8.

21 papers.

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  1. 2025Large Language Model Agent: A Survey on Methodology, Applications and Challengescited by 194
  2. 2025A Survey on Autonomy-Induced Security Risks in Large Model-Based Agentscited by 28
  3. 2025MCP-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models with Real-World MCP Serverscited by 28
  4. 2025Why Are Web AI Agents More Vulnerable Than Standalone LLMs? A Security Analysiscited by 27
  5. 2025DemonAgent: Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack on LLM-based Agentcited by 23
  6. 2025Real AI Agents with Fake Memories: Fatal Context Manipulation Attacks on Web3 Agentscited by 23
  7. 2025A Survey on the Safety and Security Threats of Computer-Using Agents: JARVIS or Ultron?cited by 23
  8. 2025Towards Enforcing Company Policy Adherence in Agentic Workflowscited by 17
  9. 2025From LLMs to MLLMs to Agents: A Survey of Emerging Paradigms in Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses within LLM Ecosystemcited by 11
  10. 2025Effective Red-Teaming of Policy-Adherent Agentscited by 10
  11. 2025Context manipulation attacks : Web agents are susceptible to corrupted memorycited by 10
  12. 2025Toward a Safe Internet of Agentscited by 6
9 more
  1. 2026Atomicity for Agents: Exposing, Exploiting, and Mitigating TOCTOU Vulnerabilities in Browser-Use Agentscited by 6
  2. 2026Structured Security Auditing and Robustness Enhancement for Untrusted Agent Skillscited by 6
  3. 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
  4. 2026WAAA! Web Adversaries Against Agentic Browserscited by 3
  5. 2025A Red Teaming Roadmap Towards System-Level Safetycited by 2
  6. 2026Efficient Agent Evaluation via Diversity-Guided User Simulationcited by 2
  7. 2026FORGE: Research-Trajectory Hijacking Attacks on Deep Research Agentscited by 1
  8. 2026Defusing Explosive Prompts: Understanding and Preventing Trigger-Based Prompt Injections in LLM Agentscited by 0
  9. 2026ChronosAttack: Adversarial Tool Scheduling Attacks on LLM Agentscited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis
  2. 2024The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
  3. 2026From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors
  4. 2026Depth-Dependent Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Calling ReAct Agents: Injection Depth, Payload Framing, and Turn-Budget Sensitivity
  5. 2026PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections
  6. 2025Indirect Prompt Injections: Are Firewalls All You Need, or Stronger Benchmarks?
  7. 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMs
  8. 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks