Approximating Auction Equilibria with Reinforcement Learning
On the map: Deep reinforcement learning methods → Adversarial robustness and RL in finance
Abstract (arXiv)
Traditional methods for computing equilibria in auctions become computationally intractable as auction complexity increases, particularly in multi-item and dynamic auctions. This paper introduces a self-play based reinforcement learning approach that employs advanced algorithms such as Proximal Policy Optimization and Neural Fictitious Self-Play to approximate Bayes-Nash equilibria. This framework allows for continuous action spaces, high-dimensional information states, and delayed payoffs. Through self-play, these algorithms can learn robust and near-optimal bidding strategies in auctions with known equilibria, including those with symmetric and asymmetric valuations, private and interdependent values, and multi-round auctions.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Adversarial robustness and RL in finance, one of 15 directions in Deep reinforcement learning methods. Builds on 1 of its 14 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Oct 2024.
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