Applying Refusal-Vector Ablation to Llama 3.1 70B Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Recently, language models like Llama 3.1 Instruct have become increasingly capable of agentic behavior, enabling them to perform tasks requiring short-term planning and tool use. In this study, we apply refusal-vector ablation to Llama 3.1 70B and implement a simple agent scaffolding to create an unrestricted agent. Our findings imply that these refusal-vector ablated models can successfully complete harmful tasks, such as bribing officials or crafting phishing attacks, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current safety mechanisms. To further explore this, we introduce a small Safe Agent Benchmark, designed to test both harmful and benign tasks in agentic scenarios. Our results imply that safety fine-tuning in chat models does not generalize well to agentic behavior, as we find that Llama 3.1 Instruct models are willing to perform most harmful tasks without modifications. At the same time, these models will refuse to give advice on how to perform the same tasks when asked for a chat completion. This highlights the growing risk of misuse as models become more capable, underscoring the need for improved safety frameworks for language model agents.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Oct 2024.
Builds on
20 of 27 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
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- 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websites6 Feb
Other references · 17
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- 2024Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Modelscited by 156
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- 2023Combating Misinformation in the Age of LLMs: Opportunities and Challengescited by 94
- 2022Self-Destructing Models: Increasing the Costs of Harmful Dual Uses of Foundation Modelscited by 56
- 2023BadLlama: cheaply removing safety fine-tuning from Llama 2-Chat 13Bcited by 35
- 2024An Empirical Evaluation of LLMs for Solving Offensive Security Challengescited by 33
- 2023Using Large Language Models for Cybersecurity Capture-The-Flag Challenges and Certification Questionscited by 23
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- 2024Dataset and Lessons Learned from the 2024 SaTML LLM Capture-the-Flag Competitioncited by 20
- 2024Measure-Observe-Remeasure: An Interactive Paradigm for Differentially-Private Exploratory Analysiscited by 19
- 2022Fact-Saboteurs: A Taxonomy of Evidence Manipulation Attacks against Fact-Verification Systemscited by 11
- 2022SoK: Content Moderation in Social Media, from Guidelines to Enforcement, and Research to Practicecited by 5
- 2023Talking Abortion (Mis)information with ChatGPT on TikTokcited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 3; 2026: 1.
5 papers.
- 2024Steering Language Model Refusal with Sparse Autoencoderscited by 89
- 2025Multi-Agent Security Tax: Trading Off Security and Collaboration Capabilities in Multi-Agent Systemscited by 27
- 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competitioncited by 22
- 2025Deceptive Automated Interpretability: Language Models Coordinating to Fool Oversight Systemscited by 3
- 2026Activation Steering Transfer to Agents: One Gain Ratio Does Not Identify Potency and Efficacycited by 0
- 2026Activation Steering Transfer to Agents: One Gain Ratio Does Not Identify Potency and Efficacy10 Jul 2026
- 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition28 Jul 2025
- 2025Deceptive Automated Interpretability: Language Models Coordinating to Fool Oversight Systems10 Apr 2025
- 2025Multi-Agent Security Tax: Trading Off Security and Collaboration Capabilities in Multi-Agent Systems26 Feb 2025
- 2024Steering Language Model Refusal with Sparse Autoencoders18 Nov 2024
Similar, not cited
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- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents
- 2023LoRA Fine-tuning Efficiently Undoes Safety Training in Llama 2-Chat 70B
- 2024Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents
- 2025When Refusals Fail: Unstable Safety Mechanisms in Long-Context LLM Agents
- 2024From Representational Harms to Quality-of-Service Harms: A Case Study on Llama 2 Safety Safeguards
- 2026Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agents
- 2023Evil Geniuses: Delving into the Safety of LLM-based Agents
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis