Uncovering Attacks and Defenses in Secure Aggregation for Federated Deep Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
Federated learning enables the collaborative learning of a global model on diverse data, preserving data locality and eliminating the need to transfer user data to a central server. However, data privacy remains vulnerable, as attacks can target user training data by exploiting the updates sent by users during each learning iteration. Secure aggregation protocols are designed to mask/encrypt user updates and enable a central server to aggregate the masked information. MicroSecAgg (PoPETS 2024) proposes a single server secure aggregation protocol that aims to mitigate the high communication complexity of the existing approaches by enabling a one-time setup of the secret to be re-used in multiple training iterations. In this paper, we identify a security flaw in the MicroSecAgg that undermines its privacy guarantees. We detail the security flaw and our attack, demonstrating how an adversary can exploit predictable masking values to compromise user privacy. Our findings highlight the critical need for enhanced security measures in secure aggregation protocols, particularly the implementation of dynamic and unpredictable masking strategies. We propose potential countermeasures to mitigate these vulnerabilities and ensure robust privacy protection in the secure aggregation frameworks.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 13 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2024.
Builds on
13 of 27 references.
References · 13
- 2014ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challengecited by 8,441
- 2016Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Modelscited by 2,221
- 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,144
- 2018The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and Testing Unintended Memorization in Neural Networkscited by 847
- 2020Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?cited by 707
- 2018Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learningcited by 509
- 2019Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learningcited by 479
- 2021When the Curious Abandon Honesty: Federated Learning Is Not Privatecited by 126
- 2022MPAF: Model Poisoning Attacks to Federated Learning based on Fake Clientscited by 65
- 2019POIROT: Aligning Attack Behavior with Kernel Audit Records for Cyber Threat Huntingcited by 27
- 2020SAPAG: A Self-Adaptive Privacy Attack From Gradientscited by 27
- 2023Flamingo: Multi-Round Single-Server Secure Aggregation with Applications to Private Federated Learningcited by 16
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