mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

FATS: A Prompt Injection Attack Utilizing Feign Security Agents with Deceptive Few-shots Learning

arXiv 2410.08776 ↗First posted 11 Oct 2024cs.CR cs.AIcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) face significant security risks despite their advanced capabilities. While techniques like Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) improve ethical alignment, excessive exposure to security-related training data may cause LLMs to overtrust such information, creating new vulnerabilities. Investigating this issue, we propose a novel attack method termed FATS (Feign Agent Attack with Toxic-shots). By obfuscating preference extraction, compromising toxicity samples, and inducing malicious behavior, we can effectively mislead LLMs into generating harmful outputs. To evaluate FATS effectiveness, we introduce the FAQuery dataset and conduct experiments on various LLMs. Well-known benchmarks like Advbench were selected to assess the approach. Results demonstrate that mainstream models, including GPT-4.1 (61.6%) and Deepseek-R1 (99.3%) are highly susceptible. It underscored the need to rigorously analyze security-related data sources during model training, developing more secure and reliable LLMs.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 11 of its 16 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Oct 2024.

Builds on

11 of 16 references.

References · 11

  1. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  2. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 328
  3. 2024Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 123
  4. 2022Why Should Adversarial Perturbations be Imperceptible? Rethink the Research Paradigm in Adversarial NLPcited by 99
  5. 2023A Survey of Safety and Trustworthiness of Large Language Models through the Lens of Verification and Validationcited by 91
  6. 2024Neural Exec: Learning (and Learning from) Execution Triggers for Prompt Injection Attackscited by 78
  7. 2024CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completioncited by 70
  8. 2023The Art of Defending: A Systematic Evaluation and Analysis of LLM Defense Strategies on Safety and Over-Defensivenesscited by 63
  9. 2023LLMSecEval: A Dataset of Natural Language Prompts for Security Evaluationscited by 58
  10. 2023FedSecurity: Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in Federated Learning and Federated LLMscited by 19
  11. 2024LLM Security Guard for Codecited by 15

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Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 1.

4 papers.

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  1. 2024The Dark Side of Human Feedback: Poisoning Large Language Models via User Inputs
  2. 2023Survey of Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models Revealed by Adversarial Attacks
  3. 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimization
  4. 2025Data Security in Large Language Models: Risks, Defense, and Directions
  5. 2024Enhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment
  6. 2024Is poisoning a real threat to LLM alignment? Maybe more so than you think
  7. 2025A Survey of Attacks on Large Language Models
  8. 2023RLHFPoison: Reward Poisoning Attack for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback in Large Language Models