Effect of Adaptation Rate and Cost Display in a Human-AI Interaction Game
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Abstract (arXiv)
As interactions between humans and AI become more prevalent, it is critical to have better predictors of human behavior in these interactions. We investigated how changes in the AI's adaptive algorithm impact behavior predictions in two-player continuous games. In our experiments, the AI adapted its actions using a gradient descent algorithm under different adaptation rates while human participants were provided cost feedback. The cost feedback was provided by one of two types of visual displays: (a) cost at the current joint action vector, or (b) cost in a local neighborhood of the current joint action vector. Our results demonstrate that AI adaptation rate can significantly affect human behavior, having the ability to shift the outcome between two game theoretic equilibrium. We observed that slow adaptation rates shift the outcome towards the Nash equilibrium, while fast rates shift the outcome towards the human-led Stackelberg equilibrium. The addition of localized cost information had the effect of shifting outcomes towards Nash, compared to the outcomes from cost information at only the current joint action vector. Future work will investigate other effects that influence the convergence of gradient descent games.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 6 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Aug 2024.
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6 of 30 references.
References · 6
- 2021Towards a Science of Human-AI Decision Making: A Survey of Empirical Studiescited by 85
- 2020Deciding Fast and Slow: The Role of Cognitive Biases in AI-assisted Decision-makingcited by 59
- 2017Cooperating with Machinescited by 39
- 2021Role of Human-AI Interaction in Selective Predictioncited by 33
- 2017Game-Theoretic Modeling of Human Adaptation in Human-Robot Collaborationcited by 21
- 2023Human adaptation to adaptive machines converges to game-theoretic equilibriacited by 2
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