On the consistent reasoning paradox of intelligence and optimal trust in AI: The power of 'I don't know'
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Abstract (arXiv)
We introduce the Consistent Reasoning Paradox (CRP). Consistent reasoning, which lies at the core of human intelligence, is the ability to handle tasks that are equivalent, yet described by different sentences ('Tell me the time!' and 'What is the time?'). The CRP asserts that consistent reasoning implies fallibility -- in particular, human-like intelligence in AI necessarily comes with human-like fallibility. Specifically, it states that there are problems, e.g. in basic arithmetic, where any AI that always answers and strives to mimic human intelligence by reasoning consistently will hallucinate (produce wrong, yet plausible answers) infinitely often. The paradox is that there exists a non-consistently reasoning AI (which therefore cannot be on the level of human intelligence) that will be correct on the same set of problems. The CRP also shows that detecting these hallucinations, even in a probabilistic sense, is strictly harder than solving the original problems, and that there are problems that an AI may answer correctly, but it cannot provide a correct logical explanation for how it arrived at the answer. Therefore, the CRP implies that any trustworthy AI (i.e., an AI that never answers incorrectly) that also reasons consistently must be able to say 'I don't know'. Moreover, this can only be done by implicitly computing a new concept that we introduce, termed the 'I don't know' function -- something currently lacking in modern AI. In view of these insights, the CRP also provides a glimpse into the behaviour of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). An AGI cannot be 'almost sure', nor can it always explain itself, and therefore to be trustworthy it must be able to say 'I don't know'.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 93 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Aug 2024.
Builds on
7 of 93 references.
References · 7
- 2022Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generationcited by 2,056
- 2023A Multitask, Multilingual, Multimodal Evaluation of ChatGPT on Reasoning, Hallucination, and Interactivitycited by 888
- 2021On Hallucination and Predictive Uncertainty in Conditional Language Generationcited by 176
- 2023Levels of AGI for Operationalizing Progress on the Path to AGIcited by 94
- 2021Can stable and accurate neural networks be computed? -- On the barriers of deep learning and Smale's 18th problemcited by 53
- 2021The extended Smale's 9th problem -- On computational barriers and paradoxes in estimation, regularisation, computer-assisted proofs and learningcited by 11
- 2022Generalised hardness of approximation and the SCI hierarchy -- On determining the boundaries of training algorithms in AIcited by 6
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 1; 2026: 3.
5 papers.
- 2025Semantic Volume: Quantifying and Detecting both External and Internal Uncertainty in LLMscited by 19
- 2026Learning from AVA: Early Lessons from a Curated and Trustworthy Generative AI for Policy and Development Researchcited by 1
- 2026The "I Don't Know" Filter: Enhancing Agentic Reliability in Function Callingcited by 1
- 2024Computability of Classification and Deep Learning: From Theoretical Limits to Practical Feasibility through Quantizationcited by 0
- 2026Position: Reasoning is a Learnable Rule-Based Processcited by 0
- 2026The "I Don't Know" Filter: Enhancing Agentic Reliability in Function Calling4 Jul 2026
- 2026Position: Reasoning is a Learnable Rule-Based Process29 May 2026
- 2026Learning from AVA: Early Lessons from a Curated and Trustworthy Generative AI for Policy and Development Research20 Apr 2026
- 2025Semantic Volume: Quantifying and Detecting both External and Internal Uncertainty in LLMs28 Feb 2025
- 2024Computability of Classification and Deep Learning: From Theoretical Limits to Practical Feasibility through Quantization12 Aug 2024