Prioritizing High-Consequence Biological Capabilities in Evaluations of Artificial Intelligence Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
As a result of rapidly accelerating AI capabilities, over the past year, national governments and multinational bodies have announced efforts to address safety, security and ethics issues related to AI models. One high priority among these efforts is the mitigation of misuse of AI models. Many biologists have for decades sought to reduce the risks of scientific research that could lead, through accident or misuse, to high-consequence disease outbreaks. Scientists have carefully considered what types of life sciences research have the potential for both benefit and risk (dual-use), especially as scientific advances have accelerated our ability to engineer organisms and create novel variants of pathogens. Here we describe how previous experience and study by scientists and policy professionals of dual-use capabilities in the life sciences can inform risk evaluations of AI models with biological capabilities. We argue that AI model evaluations should prioritize addressing high-consequence risks (those that could cause large-scale harm to the public, such as pandemics), and that these risks should be evaluated prior to model deployment so as to allow potential biosafety and/or biosecurity measures. Scientists' experience with identifying and mitigating dual-use biological risks can help inform new approaches to evaluating biological AI models. Identifying which AI capabilities post the greatest biosecurity and biosafety concerns is necessary in order to establish targeted AI safety evaluation methods, secure these tools against accident and misuse, and avoid impeding immense potential benefits.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 8 of its 88 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 May 2024.
Builds on
8 of 88 references.
References · 8
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 7.
10 papers.
- 2025Beyond Data Filtering: Knowledge Localization for Capability Removal in LLMscited by 8
- 2025Open-weight genome language model safeguards: Assessing robustness via adversarial fine-tuningcited by 4
- 2026A Blind Spot in Alignment: Quantifying Biosecurity Risks in Large Language Modelscited by 2
- 2025Mutually Assured Deregulationcited by 0
- 2026Securing Dual-Use Pathogen Data of Concerncited by 0
- 2026BioSecBench-Refusal: A paired metric for performance and alignment in agentic biosecurity risk assessmentcited by 0
- 2026Toward Trustworthy Autonomous Science: A Two-Year Community Roadmapcited by 0
- 2026Magnet: Detecting Cross-Session AI Misuse Through Capability Accumulationcited by 0
- 2026Decoy Direction Optimization: A Post-Hoc Defense Against LLM Abliterationcited by 0
- 2026Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governancecited by 0
- 2026Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance14 Sep 2026
- 2026Decoy Direction Optimization: A Post-Hoc Defense Against LLM Abliteration14 Sep 2026
- 2026A Blind Spot in Alignment: Quantifying Biosecurity Risks in Large Language Models3 Aug 2026
- 2026Magnet: Detecting Cross-Session AI Misuse Through Capability Accumulation3 Aug 2026
- 2026Toward Trustworthy Autonomous Science: A Two-Year Community Roadmap13 Jul 2026
- 2026BioSecBench-Refusal: A paired metric for performance and alignment in agentic biosecurity risk assessment6 Jul 2026
- 2026Securing Dual-Use Pathogen Data of Concern8 Feb 2026
- 2025Beyond Data Filtering: Knowledge Localization for Capability Removal in LLMs5 Dec 2025
- 2025Open-weight genome language model safeguards: Assessing robustness via adversarial fine-tuning24 Nov 2025
- 2025Mutually Assured Deregulation17 Aug 2025