mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Data Trading Combination Auction Mechanism based on the Exponential Mechanism

arXiv 2405.07336 ↗First posted 12 May 2024cs.GT cs.LGcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

With the widespread application of machine learning technology in recent years, the demand for training data has increased significantly, leading to the emergence of research areas such as data trading. The work in this field is still in the developmental stage. Different buyers have varying degrees of demand for various types of data, and auctions play a role in such scenarios due to their authenticity and fairness. Recent related work has proposed combination auction mechanisms for different domains. However, such mechanisms have not addressed the privacy concerns of buyers. In this paper, we design a textitData Trading Combination Auction Mechanism based on the exponential mechanism (DCAE) to protect buyers' bidding privacy from being leaked. We apply the exponential mechanism to select the final settlement price for the auction and generate a probability distribution based on the relationship between the price and the revenue. In the experimental aspect, we consider the selection of different mechanisms under two scenarios, and the experimental results show that this method can ensure high auction revenue and protect buyers' privacy from being violated.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 5 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 May 2024.

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References · 5

  1. 2018Model-based Pricing for Machine Learning in a Data Marketplacecited by 37
  2. 2022Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanismscited by 8
  3. 2018Differentially Private Double Spectrum Auction with Approximate Social Welfare Maximizationcited by 1
  4. 2020Differentially Private Combinatorial Cloud Auctioncited by 1
  5. 2021Combinatorial Resources Auction in Decentralized Edge-Thing Systems Using Blockchain and Differential Privacycited by 1

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