mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Fine-Tuning, Quantization, and LLMs: Navigating Unintended Outcomes

arXiv 2404.04392 ↗First posted 5 Apr 2024cs.CR cs.AIcited by 14

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread adoption across various domains, including chatbots and auto-task completion agents. However, these models are susceptible to safety vulnerabilities such as jailbreaking, prompt injection, and privacy leakage attacks. These vulnerabilities can lead to the generation of malicious content, unauthorized actions, or the disclosure of confidential information. While foundational LLMs undergo alignment training and incorporate safety measures, they are often subject to fine-tuning, or doing quantization resource-constrained environments. This study investigates the impact of these modifications on LLM safety, a critical consideration for building reliable and secure AI systems. We evaluate foundational models including Mistral, Llama series, Qwen, and MosaicML, along with their fine-tuned variants. Our comprehensive analysis reveals that fine-tuning generally increases the success rates of jailbreak attacks, while quantization has variable effects on attack success rates. Importantly, we find that properly implemented guardrails significantly enhance resistance to jailbreak attempts. These findings contribute to our understanding of LLM vulnerabilities and provide insights for developing more robust safety strategies in the deployment of language models.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 18 of its 18 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Apr 2024.

Builds on

18 of 18 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!5 Oct

Other references · 17

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 7,916
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  4. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  6. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
  7. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
  8. 2023Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Studycited by 478
  9. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347
  10. 2023DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreakercited by 337
  11. 2023Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Promptingcited by 248
  12. 2024Robust Prompt Optimization for Defending Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 150
5 more
  1. 2023ProPILE: Probing Privacy Leakage in Large Language Modelscited by 127
  2. 2023AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 102
  3. 2023Exploring Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning Techniques for Code Generation with Large Language Modelscited by 28
  4. 2020MALCOM: Generating Malicious Comments to Attack Neural Fake News Detection Modelscited by 25
  5. 2021PETGEN: Personalized Text Generation Attack on Deep Sequence Embedding-based Classification Modelscited by 17

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2024: 4; 2025: 5; 2026: 5.

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