Learning-Based Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Queues
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Abstract (arXiv)
We consider a dynamic system with multiple types of customers and servers. Each type of waiting customer or server joins a separate queue, forming a bipartite graph with customer-side queues and server-side queues. The platform can match the servers and customers if their types are compatible. The matched pairs then leave the system. The platform will charge a customer a price according to their type when they arrive and will pay a server a price according to their type. The arrival rate of each queue is determined by the price according to some unknown demand or supply functions. Our goal is to design pricing and matching algorithms to maximize the profit of the platform with unknown demand and supply functions, while keeping queue lengths of both customers and servers below a predetermined threshold. This system can be used to model two-sided markets such as ride-sharing markets with passengers and drivers. The difficulties of the problem include simultaneous learning and decision making, and the tradeoff between maximizing profit and minimizing queue length. We use a longest-queue-first matching algorithm and propose a learning-based pricing algorithm, which combines gradient-free stochastic projected gradient ascent with bisection search. We prove that our proposed algorithm yields a sublinear regret tildeO(T5/6) and anytime queue-length bound tildeO(T1/6), where T is the time horizon. We further establish a tradeoff between the regret bound and the queue-length bound: tildeO(T1-γ) versus tildeO(Tγ) for γ ∈ (0, 1/6].
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 18 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Mar 2024.
Builds on
7 of 18 references.
References · 7
- 2019Introduction to Multi-Armed Banditscited by 481
- 2018Dynamic Type Matchingcited by 8
- 2020An online learning approach to dynamic pricing and capacity sizing in service systemscited by 7
- 2019Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Queuescited by 4
- 2020Near Optimal Control in Ride Hailing Platforms with Strategic Serverscited by 1
- 2021Matching Impatient and Heterogeneous Demand and Supplycited by 1
- 2022Non-asymptotic near optimal algorithms for two sided matchingscited by 1
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