The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation
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Abstract (arXiv)
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but only through a worst-case lens. Instead, we study the expected distortion of voting rules with respect to an underlying distribution over voter utilities. Our main contribution is the design and analysis of a novel and intuitive rule, binomial voting, which provides strong distribution-independent guarantees for both expected distortion and expected welfare.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Jun 2023.
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12 of 40 references.
References · 12
- 2020Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilitiescited by 37
- 2021Distortion in Social Choice Problems: The First 15 Years and Beyondcited by 16
- 2022Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Votingcited by 12
- 2020Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecturecited by 10
- 2020Neutralizing Self-Selection Bias in Sampling for Sortitioncited by 7
- 2022Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortioncited by 6
- 2015Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferencescited by 5
- 2018A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracycited by 5
- 2018The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Tradecited by 3
- 2017Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidatescited by 2
- 2017On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidatescited by 2
- 2018On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstentioncited by 1
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