mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal

arXiv 2305.11144 ↗First posted 18 May 2023cs.GTcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study the prophet secretary problem, a well-studied variant of the classic prophet inequality, where values are drawn from independent known distributions but arrive in uniformly random order. Upon seeing a value at each step, the decision-maker has to either select it and stop or irrevocably discard it. Traditionally, the chosen benchmark is the expected reward of the prophet, who knows all the values in advance and can always select the maximum one. %% In this work, we study the prophet secretary problem against a less pessimistic but equally well-motivated benchmark; the online optimal. Here, the main goal is to find polynomial-time algorithms that guarantee near-optimal expected reward. As a warm-up, we present a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) achieving a (1-e)-approximation in O(npoly log n· f(e)) time through careful discretization and non-trivial bundling processes. Using the toolbox developed for the QPTAS, coupled with a novel frontloading technique that enables us to reduce the number of decisions we need to make, we are able to remove the dependence on n in the exponent and obtain a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for this problem.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 18 May 2023.

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