Random evolutionary games and random polynomials

In this paper, we discover that the class of random polynomials arising from the equilibrium analysis of random asymmetric evolutionary games is textitexactly the Kostlan-Shub-Smale system of random polynomials, revealing an intriguing connection between evolutionary game theory and the theory of random polynomials. Through this connection, we analytically characterize the statistics of the number of internal equilibria of random asymmetric evolutionary games, namely its mean value, probability distribution, central limit theorem and universality phenomena. Biologically, these quantities enable prediction of the levels of social and biological diversity as well as the overall complexity in a dynamical system. By comparing symmetric and asymmetric random games, we establish that symmetry in group interactions increases the expected number of internal equilibria. Our research establishes new theoretical understanding of asymmetric evolutionary games and highlights the significance of symmetry and asymmetry in group interactions.