Recover Triggered States: Protect Model Against Backdoor Attack in Reinforcement Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
A backdoor attack allows a malicious user to manipulate the environment or corrupt the training data, thus inserting a backdoor into the trained agent. Such attacks compromise the RL system's reliability, leading to potentially catastrophic results in various key fields. In contrast, relatively limited research has investigated effective defenses against backdoor attacks in RL. This paper proposes the Recovery Triggered States (RTS) method, a novel approach that effectively protects the victim agents from backdoor attacks. RTS involves building a surrogate network to approximate the dynamics model. Developers can then recover the environment from the triggered state to a clean state, thereby preventing attackers from activating backdoors hidden in the agent by presenting the trigger. When training the surrogate to predict states, we incorporate agent action information to reduce the discrepancy between the actions taken by the agent on predicted states and the actions taken on real states. RTS is the first approach to defend against backdoor attacks in a single-agent setting. Our results show that using RTS, the cumulative reward only decreased by 1.41% under the backdoor attack.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Apr 2023.
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14 of 24 references.
References · 14
- 2021SPECTRE: Defending Against Backdoor Attacks Using Robust Statisticscited by 123
- 2017Emergent Complexity via Multi-Agent Competitioncited by 117
- 2020Objective Mismatch in Model-based Reinforcement Learningcited by 87
- 2022RORL: Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning via Conservative Smoothingcited by 83
- 2019Model Agnostic Defence against Backdoor Attacks in Machine Learningcited by 52
- 2021Can You Hear It? Backdoor Attacks via Ultrasonic Triggerscited by 41
- 2023Stealthy Backdoor Attack for Code Modelscited by 32
- 2022TrojViT: Trojan Insertion in Vision Transformerscited by 30
- 2019TrojDRL: Trojan Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning Agentscited by 29
- 2022BAFFLE: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasetscited by 24
- 2020Learning Accurate Long-term Dynamics for Model-based Reinforcement Learningcited by 21
- 2022Quarantine: Sparsity Can Uncover the Trojan Attack Trigger for Freecited by 15
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