mlsanityData to 13 Oct 2026

Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location

arXiv 2212.09521 ↗First posted 19 Dec 2022cs.GT cs.AI cs.MAcited by 4

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Dec 2022.

Builds on

9 of 34 references.

References · 9

  1. 2020Algorithms with Predictionscited by 152
  2. 2022Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Locationcited by 19
  3. 2022Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictionscited by 9
  4. 2019Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectivescited by 8
  5. 2022Mechanism Design with Predictionscited by 7
  6. 2022Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictionscited by 6
  7. 2014Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Locationcited by 4
  8. 2019Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circlecited by 3
  9. 2021The Obnoxious Facility Location Game with Dichotomous Preferencescited by 1

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Cited by year

Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 3.

4 papers.

  1. 2024MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Designcited by 0
  2. 2025On multiagent online problems with predictionscited by 0
  3. 2025Mechanism Design for Facility Location using Predictionscited by 0
  4. 2025Impartial Selection with Predictionscited by 0