Federated Learning based on Defending Against Data Poisoning Attacks in IoT
On the map: LLM safety and security → Federated unlearning and poisoning
Abstract (arXiv)
The rapidly expanding number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is generating huge quantities of data, but the data privacy and security exposure in IoT devices, especially in the automatic driving system. Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that addresses data privacy, security, access rights, and access to heterogeneous message issues by integrating a global model based on distributed nodes. However, data poisoning attacks on FL can undermine the benefits, destroying the global model's availability and disrupting model training. To avoid the above issues, we build up a hierarchical defense data poisoning (HDDP) system framework to defend against data poisoning attacks in FL, which monitors each local model of individual nodes via abnormal detection to remove the malicious clients. Whether the poisoning defense server has a trusted test dataset, we design the underlinelocal underlinemodel underlinetest underlinevoting (LMTV) and underlinekullback-underlineleibler divergence underlineanomaly parameters underlinedetection (KLAD) algorithms to defend against label-flipping poisoning attacks. Specifically, the trusted test dataset is utilized to obtain the evaluation results for each classification to recognize the malicious clients in LMTV. More importantly, we adopt the kullback leibler divergence to measure the similarity between local models without the trusted test dataset in KLAD. Finally, through extensive evaluations and against the various label-flipping poisoning attacks, LMTV and KLAD algorithms could achieve the 100% and 40% to 85% successful defense ratios under different detection situations.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Federated unlearning and poisoning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. First posted on arXiv 14 Sep 2022.
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