Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic mechanism with an additive performance guarantee of O(n(1+kappa)/2) in a setting with n individuals where each individual casts O(nkappa) nominations, where kappa∈[0,1]. For kappa=0, i.e., when each individual casts at most a constant number of nominations, this bound is O(√n). This matches the best-known guarantee for randomized mechanisms and a single nomination. For kappa=1 the bound is O(n). This is trivial, as even a mechanism that never selects provides an additive guarantee of n-1. We show, however, that it is also best possible: for every deterministic impartial mechanism there exists a situation in which some individual is nominated by every other individual and the mechanism either does not select or selects an individual not nominated by anyone.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 18 May 2022.
Builds on
No reference list yet.
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 0; 2024: 0; 2025: 1.
2 papers.
- 2022Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Surveycited by 1
- 2025Impartial Selection with Predictionscited by 0
- 2025Impartial Selection with Predictions21 Oct 2025
- 2022Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey5 Oct 2022