mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

When adversarial examples are excusable

arXiv 2204.11985 ↗First posted 25 Apr 2022cs.LG cs.CRcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Neural networks work remarkably well in practice and theoretically they can be universal approximators. However, they still make mistakes and a specific type of them called adversarial errors seem inexcusable to humans. In this work, we analyze both test errors and adversarial errors on a well controlled but highly non-linear visual classification problem. We find that, when approximating training on infinite data, test errors tend to be close to the ground truth decision boundary. Qualitatively speaking these are also more difficult for a human. By contrast, adversarial examples can be found almost everywhere and are often obvious mistakes. However, when we constrain adversarial examples to the manifold, we observe a 90% reduction in adversarial errors. If we inflate the manifold by training with Gaussian noise we observe a similar effect. In both cases, the remaining adversarial errors tend to be close to the ground truth decision boundary. Qualitatively, the remaining adversarial errors are similar to test errors on difficult examples. They do not have the customary quality of being inexcusable mistakes.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 22 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Apr 2022.

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22 of 30 references.

References · 22

  1. 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 52,096
  2. 2014ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challengecited by 8,498
  3. 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
  4. 2017Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attackscited by 6,415
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  7. 2016Adversarial examples in the physical worldcited by 1,769
  8. 2019Do ImageNet Classifiers Generalize to ImageNet?cited by 1,515
  9. 2018Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examplescited by 1,268
  10. 2019Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Featurescited by 953
  11. 2017Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methodscited by 546
  12. 2019Evading Defenses to Transferable Adversarial Examples by Translation-Invariant Attackscited by 442
10 more
  1. 2018Defense-GAN: Protecting Classifiers Against Adversarial Attacks Using Generative Modelscited by 362
  2. 2017Parseval Networks: Improving Robustness to Adversarial Examplescited by 293
  3. 2017PixelDefend: Leveraging Generative Models to Understand and Defend against Adversarial Examplescited by 244
  4. 2018Disentangling Adversarial Robustness and Generalizationcited by 172
  5. 2019Adversarial Examples Are a Natural Consequence of Test Error in Noisecited by 114
  6. 2019NATTACK: Learning the Distributions of Adversarial Examples for an Improved Black-Box Attack on Deep Neural Networkscited by 94
  7. 2018Adversarial vulnerability for any classifiercited by 78
  8. 2019The Odds are Odd: A Statistical Test for Detecting Adversarial Examplescited by 75
  9. 2020Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbationscited by 55
  10. 2017Efficient Defenses Against Adversarial Attackscited by 53

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