Personalized incentives as feedback design in generalized Nash equilibrium problems
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Abstract (arXiv)
We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision a scenario in which the formal expression of the underlying potential function is not available, and we design a semi-decentralized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm. In the proposed two-layer scheme, a coordinator iteratively integrates the (possibly noisy and sporadic) agents' feedback to learn the pseudo-gradients of the agents, and then design personalized incentives for them. On their side, the agents receive those personalized incentives, compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measurements to the coordinator. In the stationary setting, our algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium in case the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, while it returns a Nash equilibrium up to a constant, yet adjustable, error in the time-varying case. As a motivating application, we consider the ridehailing service provided by several companies with mobility as a service orchestration, necessary to both handle competition among firms and avoid traffic congestion, which is also adopted to run numerical experiments verifying our results.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 69 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Mar 2022.
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27 of 69 references.
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15 more
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