mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Analyzing Human Observer Ability in Morphing Attack Detection -- Where Do We Stand?

arXiv 2202.12426 ↗First posted 24 Feb 2022cs.CV cs.CYcited by 13

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Abstract (arXiv)

Few studies have focused on examining how people recognize morphing attacks, even as several publications have examined the susceptibility of automated FRS and offered morphing attack detection (MAD) approaches. MAD approaches base their decisions either on a single image with no reference to compare against (S-MAD) or using a reference image (D-MAD). One prevalent misconception is that an examiner's or observer's capacity for facial morph detection depends on their subject expertise, experience, and familiarity with the issue and that no works have reported the specific results of observers who regularly verify identity (ID) documents for their jobs. As human observers are involved in checking the ID documents having facial images, a lapse in their competence can have significant societal challenges. To assess the observers' proficiency, this work first builds a new benchmark database of realistic morphing attacks from 48 different subjects, resulting in 400 morphed images. We also capture images from Automated Border Control (ABC) gates to mimic the realistic border-crossing scenarios in the D-MAD setting with 400 probe images to study the ability of human observers to detect morphed images. A new dataset of 180 morphing images is also produced to research human capacity in the S-MAD environment. In addition to creating a new evaluation platform to conduct S-MAD and D-MAD analysis, the study employs 469 observers for D-MAD and 410 observers for S-MAD who are primarily governmental employees from more than 40 countries, along with 103 subjects who are not examiners. The analysis offers intriguing insights and highlights the lack of expertise and failure to recognize a sizable number of morphing attacks by experts. The results of this study are intended to aid in the development of training programs to prevent security failures while determining whether an image is bona fide or altered.

Key facts. Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 6 of its 60 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Feb 2022.

Builds on

6 of 60 references.

References · 6

  1. 2014Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognitioncited by 15,267
  2. 2020Face Morphing Attack Generation & Detection: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 63
  3. 2020Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack Detectioncited by 46
  4. 2020Morphing Attack Detection -- Database, Evaluation Platform and Benchmarkingcited by 38
  5. 2019Face morphing detection in the presence of printing/scanning and heterogeneous image sourcescited by 22
  6. 2019Robust Morph-Detection at Automated Border Control Gate using Deep Decomposed 3D Shape and Diffuse Reflectancecited by 15

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2022: 2; 2023: 4; 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 2.

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