The Design and Analysis of a Mobility Game

In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on efficiency of the travelers' behavioral decision-making. In our framework, we introduce a mobility ``pricing mechanism," in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers' selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy analysis to establish that the mobility system's inefficiencies remain relatively low as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our modeling framework to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a simulation study as a proof of concept for our proposed mobility game.