mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

A BIC-based Mixture Model Defense against Data Poisoning Attacks on Classifiers

arXiv 2105.13530 ↗First posted 28 May 2021cs.LG cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks

Abstract (arXiv)

Data Poisoning (DP) is an effective attack that causes trained classifiers to misclassify their inputs. DP attacks significantly degrade a classifier's accuracy by covertly injecting attack samples into the training set. Broadly applicable to different classifier structures, without strong assumptions about the attacker, an it unsupervised Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)-based mixture model defense against "error generic" DP attacks is herein proposed that: 1) addresses the most challenging it embedded DP scenario wherein, if DP is present, the poisoned samples are an it a priori unknown subset of the training set, and with no clean validation set available; 2) applies a mixture model both to well-fit potentially multi-modal class distributions and to capture poisoned samples within a small subset of the mixture components; 3) jointly identifies poisoned components and samples by minimizing the BIC cost defined over the whole training set, with the identified poisoned data removed prior to classifier training. Our experimental results, for various classifier structures and benchmark datasets, demonstrate the effectiveness and universality of our defense under strong DP attacks, as well as its superiority over other works.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 23 of its 57 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2021.

Builds on

23 of 57 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2021De-Pois: An Attack-Agnostic Defense against Data Poisoning Attacks8 May

Other references · 22

  1. 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 51,809
  2. 2018Unsupervised Representation Learning by Predicting Image Rotationscited by 1,586
  3. 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,012
  4. 2016Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learningcited by 893
  5. 2015The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settingscited by 784
  6. 2017Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Timecited by 686
  7. 2017Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learningcited by 411
  8. 2019Differential Privacy Has Disparate Impact on Model Accuracycited by 316
  9. 2018Certified Defenses against Adversarial Examplescited by 305
  10. 2017Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attackscited by 288
  11. 2017Towards Poisoning of Deep Learning Algorithms with Back-gradient Optimizationcited by 188
  12. 2018Sever: A Robust Meta-Algorithm for Stochastic Optimizationcited by 123
10 more
  1. 2020Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attackscited by 112
  2. 2020On the Effectiveness of Mitigating Data Poisoning Attacks with Gradient Shapingcited by 82
  3. 2016Data Poisoning Attacks on Factorization-Based Collaborative Filteringcited by 78
  4. 2019Data Poisoning against Differentially-Private Learners: Attacks and Defensescited by 75
  5. 2018Label Sanitization against Label Flipping Poisoning Attackscited by 68
  6. 2021A Backdoor Attack against 3D Point Cloud Classifierscited by 50
  7. 2020Adversarial Attack on Large Scale Graphcited by 39
  8. 2016Curie: A method for protecting SVM Classifier from Poisoning Attackcited by 9
  9. 2017When Not to Classify: Anomaly Detection of Attacks (ADA) on DNN Classifiers at Test Timecited by 9
  10. 2018When Not to Classify: Detection of Reverse Engineering Attacks on DNN Image Classifierscited by 1

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