A Logic for Conditional Local Strategic Reasoning
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Abstract (arXiv)
We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner's ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly's Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning ConStR. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy-Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of ConStR and for the full logic.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 2 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Feb 2021.
Builds on
2 of 35 references.
References · 2
- 2016Reasoning about Strategies: on the Satisfiability Problemcited by 3
- 2019Intelligence in Strategic Gamescited by 3
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 1; 2024: 1.
2 papers.
- 2023De Re and De Dicto Knowledge in Egocentric Settingcited by 0
- 2024A minimal coalition logiccited by 0
- 2024A minimal coalition logic17 Mar 2024
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