Channel Effects on Surrogate Models of Adversarial Attacks against Wireless Signal Classifiers
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Abstract (arXiv)
We consider a wireless communication system that consists of a background emitter, a transmitter, and an adversary. The transmitter is equipped with a deep neural network (DNN) classifier for detecting the ongoing transmissions from the background emitter and transmits a signal if the spectrum is idle. Concurrently, the adversary trains its own DNN classifier as the surrogate model by observing the spectrum to detect the ongoing transmissions of the background emitter and generate adversarial attacks to fool the transmitter into misclassifying the channel as idle. This surrogate model may differ from the transmitter's classifier significantly because the adversary and the transmitter experience different channels from the background emitter and therefore their classifiers are trained with different distributions of inputs. This system model may represent a setting where the background emitter is a primary user, the transmitter is a secondary user, and the adversary is trying to fool the secondary user to transmit even though the channel is occupied by the primary user. We consider different topologies to investigate how different surrogate models that are trained by the adversary (depending on the differences in channel effects experienced by the adversary) affect the performance of the adversarial attack. The simulation results show that the surrogate models that are trained with different distributions of channel-induced inputs severely limit the attack performance and indicate that the transferability of adversarial attacks is neither readily available nor straightforward to achieve since surrogate models for wireless applications may significantly differ from the target model depending on channel effects.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 3 Dec 2020.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 5; 2022: 1; 2023: 2; 2024: 1.
9 papers.
- 2021Adversarial Machine Learning for 5G Communications Securitycited by 12
- 2021Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Based mmWave Beam Prediction in 5G and Beyondcited by 6
- 2022Jamming Attacks on Federated Learning in Wireless Networkscited by 6
- 2021Membership Inference Attack and Defense for Wireless Signal Classifiers with Deep Learningcited by 4
- 2021Adversarial Attacks against Deep Learning Based Power Control in Wireless Communicationscited by 4
- 2023AIR: Threats of Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning-Based Information Recoverycited by 1
- 2023Adversarial Attacks on LoRa Device Identification and Rogue Signal Detection with Deep Learningcited by 1
- 2024Adversarial Attack and Defense for LoRa Device Identification and Authentication via Deep Learningcited by 1
- 2021Covert Communications via Adversarial Machine Learning and Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfacescited by 0
- 2024Adversarial Attack and Defense for LoRa Device Identification and Authentication via Deep Learning30 Dec 2024
- 2023Adversarial Attacks on LoRa Device Identification and Rogue Signal Detection with Deep Learning27 Dec 2023
- 2023AIR: Threats of Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning-Based Information Recovery17 Aug 2023
- 2022Jamming Attacks on Federated Learning in Wireless Networks13 Jan 2022
- 2021Covert Communications via Adversarial Machine Learning and Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces21 Dec 2021
- 2021Adversarial Attacks against Deep Learning Based Power Control in Wireless Communications16 Sep 2021
- 2021Membership Inference Attack and Defense for Wireless Signal Classifiers with Deep Learning22 Jul 2021
- 2021Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Based mmWave Beam Prediction in 5G and Beyond25 Mar 2021
- 2021Adversarial Machine Learning for 5G Communications Security7 Jan 2021