Dynamic Defense Against Byzantine Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
Federated learning, as a distributed learning that conducts the training on the local devices without accessing to the training data, is vulnerable to Byzatine poisoning adversarial attacks. We argue that the federated learning model has to avoid those kind of adversarial attacks through filtering out the adversarial clients by means of the federated aggregation operator. We propose a dynamic federated aggregation operator that dynamically discards those adversarial clients and allows to prevent the corruption of the global learning model. We assess it as a defense against adversarial attacks deploying a deep learning classification model in a federated learning setting on the Fed-EMNIST Digits, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10 image datasets. The results show that the dynamic selection of the clients to aggregate enhances the performance of the global learning model and discards the adversarial and poor (with low quality models) clients.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 29 Jul 2020.
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Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 3; 2024: 1; 2025: 1.
6 papers.
- 2022A Snapshot of the Frontiers of Client Selection in Federated Learningcited by 9
- 2023Byzantine Robustness and Partial Participation Can Be Achieved at Once: Just Clip Gradient Differencescited by 5
- 2023Federated Learning Based Multilingual Emoji Prediction In Clean and Attack Scenarioscited by 3
- 2025FedDiverse: Tackling Data Heterogeneity in Federated Learning with Diversity-Driven Client Selectioncited by 1
- 2023Adversarial Client Detection via Non-parametric Subspace Monitoring in the Internet of Federated Thingscited by 0
- 2024RAB2-DEF: Dynamic and explainable defense against adversarial attacks in Federated Learning to fair poor clientscited by 0
- 2025FedDiverse: Tackling Data Heterogeneity in Federated Learning with Diversity-Driven Client Selection15 Apr 2025
- 2024RAB2-DEF: Dynamic and explainable defense against adversarial attacks in Federated Learning to fair poor clients10 Oct 2024
- 2023Byzantine Robustness and Partial Participation Can Be Achieved at Once: Just Clip Gradient Differences23 Nov 2023
- 2023Adversarial Client Detection via Non-parametric Subspace Monitoring in the Internet of Federated Things2 Oct 2023
- 2023Federated Learning Based Multilingual Emoji Prediction In Clean and Attack Scenarios30 Mar 2023
- 2022A Snapshot of the Frontiers of Client Selection in Federated Learning27 Sep 2022