Multi-Issue Bargaining With Deep Reinforcement Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
Negotiation is a process where agents aim to work through disputes and maximize their surplus. As the use of deep reinforcement learning in bargaining games is unexplored, this paper evaluates its ability to exploit, adapt, and cooperate to produce fair outcomes. Two actor-critic networks were trained for the bidding and acceptance strategy, against time-based agents, behavior-based agents, and through self-play. Gameplay against these agents reveals three key findings. 1) Neural agents learn to exploit time-based agents, achieving clear transitions in decision preference values. The Cauchy distribution emerges as suitable for sampling offers, due to its peaky center and heavy tails. The kurtosis and variance sensitivity of the probability distributions used for continuous control produce trade-offs in exploration and exploitation. 2) Neural agents demonstrate adaptive behavior against different combinations of concession, discount factors, and behavior-based strategies. 3) Most importantly, neural agents learn to cooperate with other behavior-based agents, in certain cases utilizing non-credible threats to force fairer results. This bears similarities with reputation-based strategies in the evolutionary dynamics, and departs from equilibria in classical game theory.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 18 Feb 2020.
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 1; 2024: 1; 2025: 0; 2026: 3.
5 papers.
- 2024Fairness-Aware Meta-Learning via Nash Bargainingcited by 6
- 2026Training Language Models for Bilateral Trade with Private Informationcited by 5
- 2023Coalitional Bargaining via Reinforcement Learning: An Application to Collaborative Vehicle Routingcited by 1
- 2026Distilling Bayesian Belief States into Language Models for Auditable Negotiationcited by 1
- 2026How Much Due Diligence Before You Bid? Learning in Intractable Takeover Auctionscited by 1
- 2026How Much Due Diligence Before You Bid? Learning in Intractable Takeover Auctions28 Jun 2026
- 2026Distilling Bayesian Belief States into Language Models for Auditable Negotiation6 May 2026
- 2026Training Language Models for Bilateral Trade with Private Information10 Apr 2026
- 2024Fairness-Aware Meta-Learning via Nash Bargaining11 Jun 2024
- 2023Coalitional Bargaining via Reinforcement Learning: An Application to Collaborative Vehicle Routing26 Oct 2023