mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games with double-integrator agents

arXiv 1811.07569 ↗First posted 19 Nov 2018math.OC cs.GT cs.MAcited by 1

Not on the map. Why?

Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of double-integrator agents, which can be represented as a graph. Virtual couplings, i.e., pairs of spring-damper, assigned to each edge of the graph, allow to synthesize a distributed, gradient-based control law that steers the network to an invariant set of stable configurations. We characterize the points belonging to such set as Nash equilibria of the associated potential game, relating the parameters of the virtual couplings with the equilibrium seeking problem, since they are crucial to shape the transient behaviour (i.e., the convergence) and, ideally, the set of reachable equilibria.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 19 Nov 2018.

Builds on

No reference list yet.

Built on by

Cited by year

Citing papers per year: 2021: 1.

1 paper.