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Towards Detecting Compromised Accounts on Social Networks

arXiv 1509.03531 ↗First posted 11 Sep 2015cs.CR cs.SIcited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

Compromising social network accounts has become a profitable course of action for cybercriminals. By hijacking control of a popular media or business account, attackers can distribute their malicious messages or disseminate fake information to a large user base. The impacts of these incidents range from a tarnished reputation to multi-billion dollar monetary losses on financial markets. In our previous work, we demonstrated how we can detect large-scale compromises (i.e., so-called campaigns) of regular online social network users. In this work, we show how we can use similar techniques to identify compromises of individual high-profile accounts. High-profile accounts frequently have one characteristic that makes this detection reliable -- they show consistent behavior over time. We show that our system, were it deployed, would have been able to detect and prevent three real-world attacks against popular companies and news agencies. Furthermore, our system, in contrast to popular media, would not have fallen for a staged compromise instigated by a US restaurant chain for publicity reasons.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 11 Sep 2015.

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Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 1; 2024: 0; 2025: 0; 2026: 1.

3 papers.