The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form
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Abstract (arXiv)
We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n >= 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP_a. In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task of computing an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in strategic form games with three (or more) players.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 5 Aug 2014.
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- 2021Temporal Induced Self-Play for Stochastic Bayesian Games21 Aug 2021