# L3M: A Verifiable Harness and Runtime for Self-Extending and Self-Improving Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19591 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.19591/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in General LLM agent frameworks and benchmarks, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 26 of its 63 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 14 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [General LLM agent frameworks and benchmarks](https://mlsanity.com/agents/general-llm-agent-frameworks-and-benchmarks/)
- Synthetic data and self-improvement for LLMs / [Self-evolving LLM agents](https://mlsanity.com/synth/self-evolving-llm-agents/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 26 of 26)

- [AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.08155/) (2023)
- [MetaGPT: Meta Programming for A Multi-Agent Collaborative Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.00352/) (2023)
- [SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15793/) (2024)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Executable Code Actions Elicit Better LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.01030/) (2024)
- [AI safety via debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.00899/) (2018)
- [Large Language Models as Tool Makers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.17126/) (2023)
- [Defeating Prompt Injections by Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18813/) (2025)
- [AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06942/) (2023)
- [Self-Taught Optimizer (STOP): Recursively Self-Improving Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02304/) (2023)
- [Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.11703/) (2025)
- [SWE-Search: Enhancing Software Agents with Monte Carlo Tree Search and Iterative Refinement](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.20285/) (2024)
- [Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23643/) (2025)
- [AIOS: LLM Agent Operating System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.16971/) (2024)
- [The OpenHands Software Agent SDK: A Composable and Extensible Foundation for Production Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.03690/) (2025)
- [Magentic-UI: Towards Human-in-the-loop Agentic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.22358/) (2025)
- [Dive into Claude Code: The Design Space of Today's and Future AI Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.14228/) (2026)
- [Learning to Give Checkable Answers with Prover-Verifier Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.12099/) (2021)
- [Avoiding Obfuscation with Prover-Estimator Debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.13609/) (2025)
- [Agent libOS: A Runtime Substrate for Capability-Controlled Self-Evolving LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.03895/) (2026)
- [Harness Engineering: Anatomy, Architecture, and Evolution of Coding Agents -- A Source-Code Study of Eleven Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.00006/) (2026)
- [Toward Securing AI Agents Like Operating Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14932/) (2026)
- [The LLMbda Calculus: AI Agents, Conversations, and Information Flow](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.20064/) (2026)
- [Trust but Verify: Prover-Verifier Deliberation for Selective LLM Prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.25133/) (2026)
- [Quine: Realizing LLM Agents as Native POSIX Processes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.18030/) (2026)
- [Towards an Agent Operating System - Lessons from Classical and Cloud OS](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.25076/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The lasting gains in AI have come from methods that absorb more computation, and language models already scale computation within a call. Useful work, though, happens across calls: over hours or days, through tools and external systems, among many agents and the humans they work for, and increasingly through code the agents write themselves. Whether that work compounds is enabled by the harness around it, and the harness faces a constraint the model does not: of the three participants in such a computation, the human, the model and code, only the human's attention does not scale, so the computation can grow only if the human is not in every loop. L3M is a runtime built on that premise, written in Lean 4 so that one language implements the harness, states its invariants, and is the language agents extend it in. One computation spans humans, agents, models and code, and all of its state lives in Git: a rich state trajectory -- rather than a chat conversation -- is an object the runtime can resume, rewind, fork, compare and merge. Waiting, communication, delegation and undo are primitives, not patterns the model reasons through each time. When an agent works out a procedure, it can write it once as a sealed Lean program whose type is its permission request, and the harness offers it back as a tool -- machinery for the model to use. To take the human out of the loop, L3M uses reversibility to decide where that is safe: a tool's review tier follows from how far its effects can be undone, so agents act freely where the runtime can recover. Because the machinery can change, the properties that make this safe are stated as kernel-checked theorems about the code that runs. On Terminal-Bench, an untuned L3M reaches about two thirds of its (unsafe) shell-equipped pass rate using only safe (not needing human review) tools.
