# AgentCIScope: Grounded Contextual Integrity Evaluation for LLM Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19158 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.19158/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 10 of its 23 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.17884/) (2023)
- [PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Action](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.00138/) (2024)
- [AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.09780/) (2025)
- [GoldCoin: Grounding Large Language Models in Privacy Laws via Contextual Integrity Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11149/) (2024)
- [CI-Bench: Benchmarking Contextual Integrity of AI Assistants on Synthetic Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.13903/) (2024)
- [PrivaCI-Bench: Evaluating Privacy with Contextual Integrity and Legal Compliance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.17041/) (2025)
- [CI-Work: Benchmarking Contextual Integrity in Enterprise LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.21308/) (2026)
- [DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.04808/) (2026)
- [Capable but Careless: Do Computer-Use Agents Follow Contextual Integrity?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.23189/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents are becoming increasingly capable of handling daily workspace tasks by interacting with application environments through tool calls. However, as agents read and write sensitive user data across email, documents, and other applications, a central privacy question is whether they preserve contextual integrity (CI), that is, whether the information flows they produce comply with context-specific disclosure constraints. Existing work either focuses on model-level privacy leakage or evaluates agents in limited application environments with manually constructed disclosure constraints. In this work, we introduce AgentCIScope, a unified platform and benchmark for evaluating agent-level contextual integrity through executable, multi-step tasks across diverse, realistic application environments. AgentCIScope transforms public and synthetic privacy cases into executable agent tasks, with disclosure constraints grounded in three criteria: governing privacy policies, persona-based agreement, and a predefined sensitive-attribute taxonomy. Based on AgentCIScope, we evaluate 12 agents on 936 tasks and find that strong task-completion capability does not guarantee contextual-integrity preservation: single-run leakage rates range from 32.5% to 94.4%, while repeating each task five times further increases leakage by 4-19 percentage points. Leakage varies substantially across attributes: personal preferences and booking details have average leakage rates of 84.7% and 76.5%, compared with 17.1% for credit-card information and 29.4% for SSNs; environments: calendar has the highest average leakage rate as an information source, while WhatsApp ranks highest as an information destination; and governing privacy policies. AgentCIScope provides deep insights into agent privacy leakage and serves as a unified testbed for developing privacy-preserving agents.