# Prompt-Injection Probes Learn the Conversation, Not Just the Injection

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.18408 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.18408/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 30 of its 52 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Backdoor and data poisoning attacks](https://mlsanity.com/safety/backdoor-and-data-poisoning-attacks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 30)

- [Shortcut Learning in Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.07780/) (2020)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.10925/) (2025)
- [Right for the Wrong Reasons: Diagnosing Syntactic Heuristics in Natural Language Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.01007/) (2019)
- [Probing Classifiers: Promises, Shortcomings, and Advances](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.12452/) (2021)
- [The Geometry of Truth: Emergent Linear Structure in Large Language Model Representations of True/False Datasets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06824/) (2023)
- [Annotation Artifacts in Natural Language Inference Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.02324/) (2018)
- [Designing and Interpreting Probes with Control Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.03368/) (2019)
- [Learning the Difference that Makes a Difference with Counterfactually-Augmented Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.12434/) (2019)
- [Small Language Models are the Future of Agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.02153/) (2025)
- [Probing the Probing Paradigm: Does Probing Accuracy Entail Task Relevance?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.00719/) (2020)
- [LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.03574/) (2025)
- [NVIDIA Nemotron Nano 2: An Accurate and Efficient Hybrid Mamba-Transformer Reasoning Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14444/) (2025)
- [Nemotron 3 Nano: Open, Efficient Mixture-of-Experts Hybrid Mamba-Transformer Model for Agentic Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.20848/) (2025)
- [Attention Tracker: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.00348/) (2024)
- [Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.06833/) (2024)
- [Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.00799/) (2024)
- [Detecting High-Stakes Interactions with Activation Probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.10805/) (2025)
- [PromptShield: Deployable Detection for Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.15145/) (2025)
- [Building Production-Ready Probes For Gemini](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.11516/) (2026)
- [Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.09565/) (2024)
- [Lessons from Defending Gemini Against Indirect Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14534/) (2025)
- [The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.10453/) (2026)
- [EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.10540/) (2025)
- [PIShield: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks via Intrinsic LLM Features](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14005/) (2025)
- [When AUC 0.998 Is Not Enough: A Candidate Evaluation Protocol for Hidden-State Probes of Indirect Prompt Injection in Multimodal Computer-Use Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.22864/) (2026)
- [Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.02657/) (2026)
- [Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Prevalence, Techniques, and Objectives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.27202/) (2026)
- [Measuring Real-World Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-based Resume Screening](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.28999/) (2026)
- [Readable Before Actionable: Causal Tracing of Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05295/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Linear probes on a model's hidden states are used as cheap monitors for indirect prompt injection: they screen the tool outputs an agent reads and send suspicious ones to a slower second check, so every false alarm has a cost. But a probe learns whatever separates its training examples. The standard evaluation of injection probes can be passed without the model: conversation position and text lengths alone reach 0.91-0.98 AUROC. When each attack is compared with the same conversation without the injection, or with harmless text formatted like an injection, standard probes flag most of these harmless cases. We add such cases to the training data as matched negatives. Across six open models, in applications seen during training and at the default threshold, changing only the training data cuts false alarms on injection-free conversations from 41-80% to 4-27%, and on harmless look-alikes from 92-98% to 3-16%. With a threshold set on normal traffic, our probe still catches a median 95% of the attacks that fooled the agent (91% without our data). In new applications, false alarms stay low, but detection depends on the model and on how the threshold is set. The same data also helps a text-only filter.