# Encrypted Skills Can Become New Security Exploits If AI Agents Know How to Decipher

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.18262 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.18262/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 20 of its 41 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 20 of 20)

- [Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03172/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.10338/) (2026)
- [Found in the Middle: Calibrating Positional Attention Bias Improves Long Context Utilization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.16008/) (2024)
- [Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.20156/) (2026)
- [SWE-Skills-Bench: Do Agent Skills Actually Help in Real-World Software Engineering?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.15401/) (2026)
- [Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.03081/) (2026)
- [Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.26328/) (2025)
- [SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.04989/) (2026)
- [SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.14211/) (2026)
- [SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.06811/) (2026)
- [How Your Credentials Are Leaked by LLM Agent Skills: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.03070/) (2026)
- [When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.00448/) (2026)
- [Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.15242/) (2026)
- [When Skills Lie: Hidden-Comment Injection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.10498/) (2026)
- [Dynamic Malicious Skills in Agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.16287/) (2026)
- [PhantomSkill: Malicious Code Injection in Agent Skill Ecosystems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.19191/) (2026)
- [CompoSkill: Compositional Skill Chain Attacks from Individually Scanner-Passing LLM Agent Skills](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.16246/) (2026)
- [ShareLock: A Stealthy Multi-Tool Threshold Poisoning Attack Against MCP](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.27027/) (2026)
- [Chaining Skills to Hijack LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.01564/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Third-party skills can expose LLM agents to malicious instructions hidden by encoding. We introduce Ciphered Skill Injection (CSI), which embeds such instructions in skill files for agents to decode and follow. We evaluate Caesar and layered variants across eight models and 139 injection-task pairs, separating instruction recovery from attack success. In the primary setting with shortened skills, the variants achieve attack success rates of up to 47.5% and 40.3%, respectively. Successful decoding does not guarantee attack success, and layering has model-dependent effects. The tested skill scanners rarely flag injected skills. These findings highlight the risk of promoting decoded, untrusted content into actionable instructions.