# SEEK: Agentic Knowledge Graph Retrieval for Secure Code Generation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.14968 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.14968/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 17 of its 50 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 17 of 17)

- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [Knowledge Graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.02320/) (2020)
- [Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.09293/) (2021)
- [RepoCoder: Repository-Level Code Completion Through Iterative Retrieval and Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.12570/) (2023)
- [Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.08921/) (2024)
- [DocPrompting: Generating Code by Retrieving the Docs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.05987/) (2022)
- [Retrieval Augmented Code Generation and Summarization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.11601/) (2021)
- [ReACC: A Retrieval-Augmented Code Completion Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.07722/) (2022)
- [Instruction Tuning for Secure Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.09497/) (2024)
- [Vul-RAG: Enhancing LLM-based Vulnerability Detection via Knowledge-level RAG](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11147/) (2024)
- [We Have a Package for You! A Comprehensive Analysis of Package Hallucinations by Code Generating LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.10279/) (2024)
- [Prompting Techniques for Secure Code Generation: A Systematic Investigation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.07064/) (2024)
- [How secure is AI-generated Code: A Large-Scale Comparison of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.18353/) (2024)
- [An Empirical Study of Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation: Challenges and Opportunities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.13742/) (2025)
- [Give LLMs a Security Course: Securing Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation via Knowledge Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.16429/) (2025)
- [INDICT: Code Generation with Internal Dialogues of Critiques for Both Security and Helpfulness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.02518/) (2024)
- [SOSecure: Safer Code Generation with RAG and StackOverflow Discussions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.13654/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate functionally correct code while introducing exploitable security weaknesses, particularly when developers specify functionality without explicit security requirements. Recent state-of-the-art approaches mitigate this problem using external security knowledge, but largely rely on flat similarity-based retrieval over independent artifacts, making it difficult to infer the relevant vulnerability space and retrieve targeted knowledge when direct matches are unavailable. We propose SEEK, an agentic Graph RAG framework for secure code generation that constructs a security knowledge graph using the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) taxonomy as its structural backbone and injects it with curated real-world CVE vulnerability-fix instances. At inference time, a Planner Agent predicts potential CWE weaknesses associated with the developer query, which guide Graph Scoping to restrict retrieval to relevant regions of the CWE taxonomy before deterministic multi-faceted candidate ranking. A Selection Agent subsequently validates the predicted weaknesses and retrieved candidates prior to code generation. Across five open-source LLMs, we evaluate SEEK in an out-of-distribution setting on CodeGuard+ and CyberSecEval, spanning C, C++, and Python. SEEK achieves the highest SecurePass@1 of 77.45% on CodeGuard+ and the highest aggregate ICD pass rate of 79.45% on CyberSecEval, surpassing prior approaches. Moreover, SEEK achieves 85.2% SecurePass@1 across 13 unseen CWE types with no directly linked vulnerability-fix instances, demonstrating strong generalizability, while maintaining acceptable inference latency costs.