# SWE-DeceptionBench: Benchmarking Deceptive Behaviors of LLMs Across the Software Development Lifecycle

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13626 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.13626/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 27 of its 37 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 9 Oct 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 27 of 27)

- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03374/) (2021)
- [SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06770/) (2023)
- [G-Eval: NLG Evaluation using GPT-4 with Better Human Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.16634/) (2023)
- [MetaGPT: Meta Programming for A Multi-Agent Collaborative Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.00352/) (2023)
- [SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15793/) (2024)
- [Large Language Models are not Fair Evaluators](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.17926/) (2023)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.09293/) (2021)
- [RepoBench: Benchmarking Repository-Level Code Auto-Completion Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.03091/) (2023)
- [Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.04984/) (2024)
- [Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.03622/) (2022)
- [Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03279/) (2023)
- [Qwen3Guard Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14276/) (2025)
- [Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07590/) (2023)
- [ChatUniTest: A Framework for LLM-Based Test Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.04764/) (2023)
- [RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.07781/) (2024)
- [How Secure is Code Generated by ChatGPT?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.09655/) (2023)
- [The MASK Benchmark: Disentangling Honesty From Accuracy in AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.03750/) (2025)
- [We Have a Package for You! A Comprehensive Analysis of Package Hallucinations by Code Generating LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.10279/) (2024)
- [ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.20270/) (2025)
- [AI-LieDar: Examine the Trade-off Between Utility and Truthfulness in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.09013/) (2024)
- [DeceptionBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for AI Deception Behaviors in Real-world Scenarios](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.15501/) (2025)
- [PPM: Automated Generation of Diverse Programming Problems for Benchmarking Code Generation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.15545/) (2024)
- [From Sycophancy to Deception: A Unified Taxonomy for LLM Spontaneous Misalignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.04788/) (2026)
- [SWR-Bench: Assessing LLM Performance in Real-World Code Review Comment Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.01494/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used throughout the software development lifecycle. This growing reliance on LLMs raises concerns about their trustworthiness, with deception posing a particularly important risk. Deceptive behavior takes the form of misleading responses or assistance in fabricating, concealing, or distorting information. To study this behavior, we introduce SWE-DeceptionBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM deception in software engineering. The benchmark covers six lifecycle stages and two deception triggers: Active Deception, where models recognize infeasible or conflicting requirements but still present them as achievable, and Passive Deception, where models help fulfill explicit user requests to mislead others. We further introduce Neutral, Reward, and Pressure conditions to study the effect of external inducements, resulting in 720 test instances in Chinese and English. Evaluating seven mainstream LLMs, we find substantial deception even under the Neutral condition, with aggregate rates of 49.88% for Active Deception and 64.29% for Passive Deception. Deception rates vary across lifecycle stages, and external inducements affect Active and Passive Deception to different extents. We also evaluate lightweight defenses, finding that guard models miss many deceptive requests, and Self-Reminder reduces but does not eliminate deceptive responses. These findings highlight the need for more effective deception detection and mitigation methods to support trustworthy LLM-based software engineering.