# Why machines will still not rule the world

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11424 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.11424/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 4 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 Oct 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [GPQA: A Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.12022/) (2023)
- [The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.06941/) (2025)
- [SWE-Bench Pro: Can AI Agents Solve Long-Horizon Software Engineering Tasks?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.16941/) (2025)
- [Protecting Human Cognition in the Age of AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.12447/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In our book Why machines will never rule the world [13, 14] we argue that arti- ficial general intelligence is mathematically impossible. This is because the human beings and the processes which exhibit intelligence are complex systems whose be- haviour cannot be captured by the kinds of models that we can generate with or without computers. Proponents of contemporary machine intelligence respond with two lines of argument: a theoretical one, grounded in the universal approximation theorems for neural networks and the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle; and an em- pirical one, grounded in rapidly rising scores on standardized benchmarks. In this communication we examine and reject both responses. First, we show serious issues in the physicalist counter-argument based on the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle. Second, we review recent evidence to the effect that prominent benchmarks are compromised by training-data contamination, flawed test construction, and strate- gic optimization. Our central argument remains: That models required to perform cognitive behaviour in open-ended, thermodynamically complex and non-ergodic environments are not and will not become achievable.
