# Which Image Property Carries the Jailbreak? A Controlled Dissection of Image-to-Text Jailbreaks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07009 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.07009/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 22 of its 28 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 22 of 22)

- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Qwen3-VL Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.21631/) (2025)
- [Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06674/) (2023)
- [Eyes Wide Shut? Exploring the Visual Shortcomings of Multimodal LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06209/) (2024)
- [FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05608/) (2023)
- [A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10260/) (2024)
- [Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.13213/) (2023)
- [MM-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17600/) (2023)
- [JailBreakV: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.03027/) (2024)
- [Safety Fine-Tuning at (Almost) No Cost: A Baseline for Vision Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02207/) (2024)
- [Images are Achilles' Heel of Alignment: Exploiting Visual Vulnerabilities for Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09792/) (2024)
- [AdaShield: Safeguarding Multimodal Large Language Models from Structure-based Attack via Adaptive Shield Prompting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09513/) (2024)
- [Jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models Through Multi-Modal Linkage](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.00473/) (2024)
- [White-box Multimodal Jailbreaks Against Large Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.17894/) (2024)
- [Distraction is All You Need for Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.10794/) (2025)
- [Visual Contextual Attack: Jailbreaking MLLMs with Image-Driven Context Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02844/) (2025)
- [FC-Attack: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Auto-Generated Flowcharts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.21059/) (2025)
- [VisCRA: A Visual Chain Reasoning Attack for Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.19684/) (2025)
- [VRSA: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models through Visual Reasoning Sequential Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.05853/) (2025)
- [Towards Effective MLLM Jailbreaking Through Balanced On-Topicness and OOD-Intensity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.09218/) (2025)
- [Reading Between the Pixels: Linking Text-Image Embedding Alignment to Typographic Attack Success on Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.12371/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Image-to-text jailbreaks place harmful intent in text, image content, or the relationship between them. We examine image-side factors across four published attack families on a 313-prompt StrongREJECT slice, using five multimodal models and an additional appendix evaluation of InternVL3.5-8B. The harmful instruction is held constant across conditions; the baseline matrix uses one draw per prompt, and paired ablations use three draws with an automated rubric judge. A bare harmful query, with or without a benign unrelated image, produces little attack success on most victims, while attack images substantially increase it. First, per-tile entropy and JPEG size do not reliably distinguish attack tiles from size-matched benign distractors, limiting density-only screening. Second, earlier tile-count ladders were confounded by payload visibility. A corrected region-count test found no detectable effect, so the role of tile-count structure remains unresolved. Third, on Qwen3-VL-8B, the E4 manipulation that removes query-specific relatedness lowers ASR by about 0.12. This supports a bounded attribution to the relatedness manipulation, although image-text congruence remains unmeasured. A within-category control reproduces the direction on overlapping stimuli. Five tests survive the global statistical correction, but only E4 supports attribution to one measured descriptor; the within-category result is a robustness check, not a separate attribution. These conclusions remain conditional on the rubric judge.