# Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05823 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05823/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 20 of its 51 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 20 of 20)

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- [From Product Search to Preference Articulation: The Economics of Agentic Commerce](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.08395/) (2026)
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## Abstract (arXiv)

Personal AI assistants are beginning to transact for consumers, and early adopters capture real savings. Whether those savings survive, and what happens to consumers who have no assistant, depends on how sellers respond -- a question single-user evidence cannot answer. We build an agent-based rental market in which language models play consumers, assistants, and six adaptive sellers guided by an algorithmic pricing tool. Half the population receives an assistant under an advisory or an executing mandate; the contract pairs a fee only the renter's physical action avoids with a pre-selected add-on an authorised assistant can cancel online. An analytical benchmark and a behaviourally calibrated rule market supply ex-ante predictions, and paired branches with frozen versus adaptive sellers separate adoption effects from market feedback. Across thirty simulated markets, executing assistants cut adopters' spending by 13.7 USD per renter-day when sellers are frozen; adaptation claws back about a third, leaving 8.7, with the gains arriving both as lower bills and as rentals completed at all. Sellers raise headline rates while cutting fees, and the calibrated forecast of the burden on unassisted consumers (+3.6) does not transfer: their mean spending change is +0.4, confidence interval -0.6 to +1.3. Seller-model swaps and a within-market transfer of fee-setting to the pricing tool show that fee conduct, and with it the division of the gains, is decided on the seller side. Assistants, we conclude, should be evaluated at market level -- completion, total spending, and non-users included -- and the comparison layers locate exactly where a calibrated behavioural forecast fails in a language-model market.