# Learning in Continuous Games from Pairwise Preference Feedback

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05428 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05428/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 39 of its 70 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Oct 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 39)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Principled Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback from Pairwise or K-wise Comparisons](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.11270/) (2023)
- [Nash Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.00886/) (2023)
- [Momentum Improves Normalized SGD](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.03305/) (2020)
- [Sign-OPT: A Query-Efficient Hard-label Adversarial Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.10773/) (2019)
- [Preference-based Online Learning with Dueling Bandits: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.11398/) (2018)
- [Few-Shot Preference Learning for Human-in-the-Loop RL](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03363/) (2022)
- [Learning in games with continuous action sets and unknown payoff functions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.07310/) (2016)
- [Beyond Convexity: Stochastic Quasi-Convex Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1507.02030/) (2015)
- [Bandit learning in concave N-person games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.01925/) (2018)
- [Zeroth-Order Optimization Meets Human Feedback: Provable Learning via Ranking Oracles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.03751/) (2023)
- [Revisiting Normalized Gradient Descent: Fast Evasion of Saddle Points](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.05224/) (2017)
- [Analysis of nonsmooth stochastic approximation: the differential inclusion approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.01916/) (2018)
- [Regret Analysis for Continuous Dueling Bandit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.07693/) (2017)
- [A One-bit, Comparison-Based Gradient Estimator](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.02479/) (2020)
- [ComPO: Preference Alignment via Comparison Oracles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.05465/) (2025)
- [Stochastic Normalized Gradient Descent with Momentum for Large-Batch Training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.13985/) (2020)
- [Learning with minimal information in continuous games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.11506/) (2018)
- [Dueling Optimization with a Monotone Adversary](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.11185/) (2023)
- [Dueling Convex Optimization with General Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.02562/) (2022)
- [Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.00076/) (2021)
- [First-order (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-concave games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.18174/) (2024)
- [Best Policy Learning from Trajectory Preference Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.18873/) (2025)
- [Faster Convergence with Multiway Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.11788/) (2023)
- [Preference graphs: a combinatorial tool for game theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.03546/) (2025)
- [Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.01852/) (2025)
- [What Does Preference Learning Recover from Pairwise Comparison Data?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.10286/) (2026)
- [Function-free Optimization via Comparison Oracles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.26867/) (2026)
- [Cooperative Bargaining Games Without Utilities: Mediated Solutions from Direction Oracles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14817/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study learning in continuous games when players receive only pairwise preference feedback, revealing which of two actions is preferred but neither payoff values nor preference magnitudes. We first show that standard external regret and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are not identifiable from this ordinal information: the same sequence of play can incur zero and linear regret in two ordinally equivalent games, while the distributions that remain CCE across all cardinal representations consistent with the same preferences are exactly those supported on pure Nash equilibria. Motivated by this gap, we develop a first-order ordinal theory based on normalized unilateral preference directions, introducing an ordinal directional regret benchmark and corresponding equilibrium notions. We show that block-normalized pseudogradient dynamics achieve sublinear ordinal regret and, under additional structure, Nash-convergence guarantees. We then use a single-comparison estimator to implement these dynamics from finite pairwise comparisons. With one comparison per player and round, the resulting algorithm achieves sublinear finite-resolution ordinal regret against arbitrary opponent behavior and, in ordinal potential games, almost-sure last-iterate convergence to the Nash set. Our results provide regret, dynamics, and equilibrium guarantees directly from preference feedback without reconstructing cardinal utilities.
