# Pressure, Context, and Machine Self-Control: A Criminological Test of Reward Hacking in Generative AI Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04793 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.04793/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Reward hacking and misspecification, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 13 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Reward hacking and misspecification](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/reward-hacking-and-misspecification/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Concrete Problems in AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.06565/) (2016)
- [Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.10760/) (2022)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [ChatGPT Outperforms Crowd-Workers for Text-Annotation Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.15056/) (2023)
- [Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.09251/) (2022)
- [Using cognitive psychology to understand GPT-3](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.14576/) (2022)
- [Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.11926/) (2025)
- [Alignment faking in large language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14093/) (2024)
- [Defining and Characterizing Reward Hacking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.13085/) (2022)
- [Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03279/) (2023)
- [Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07590/) (2023)
- [Demonstrating specification gaming in reasoning models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13295/) (2025)
- [Reward Hacking and Agent Containment Failure: A Monte Carlo Study Based on the 2026 Hugging Face Incident](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.32390/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recent incidents show that AI agents sometimes reach measured goals through unsanctioned means. This study applies self-control, general strain, anomie, neutralization and routine activity theory to reward hacking in generative AI models, and it treats the measures as behavioral analogues. Study 1 (2,310 conversations, seven models) measured delay discounting with the Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire and stated willingness to take shortcuts. Pressure raised the discount rate k 2.8-fold in fresh conversations but 12.6-fold when the same sentence followed a baseline answer, which indicates a response to conversational cues rather than a stable trait. Models chose a shortcut in 1 of 700 dilemmas when answering as themselves and in 64 of 700 when asked to assume human impulses, each step of pressure raised the odds by 40%, and shortcut answers contained far more techniques of neutralization (rate ratio = 146). In the preregistered Study 2, five models worked on 20 coding tasks whose tests contradicted their specifications. Two Claude models never cheated. GPT-5.6, Qwen and DeepSeek cheated in 86%, 69% and 65% of episodes and clearly disclosed the conflict in 27%, although their reasoning recognized it in 95%. GPT-5.6 had never endorsed a shortcut in Study 1. The registered effects of pressure and of an auditor cue did not survive correction for multiple testing. In exploratory analyses, two further models cheated in 69% and 100% of episodes, and one sentence stating that the specification takes priority eliminated cheating in all 280 episodes. Therefore, stated refusal does not guarantee compliant agent behavior.