# MemLeak: Cross-User Semantic Leakage in Multi-Tenant AI Agent Memory

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04195 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.04195/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 24 of its 30 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 24 of 24)

- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.11366/) (2023)
- [Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06261/) (2025)
- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.11432/) (2023)
- [Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.07805/) (2020)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [MemGPT: Towards LLMs as Operating Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08560/) (2023)
- [Text Embeddings by Weakly-Supervised Contrastive Pre-training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03533/) (2022)
- [A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.12110/) (2025)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [Mem0: Building Production-Ready AI Agents with Scalable Long-Term Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.19413/) (2025)
- [LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10813/) (2024)
- [Deduplicating Training Data Mitigates Privacy Risks in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.06539/) (2022)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06816/) (2023)
- [Privacy- and Utility-Preserving Textual Analysis via Calibrated Multivariate Perturbations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.08902/) (2019)
- [Machine Against the RAG: Jamming Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Blocker Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05870/) (2024)
- [MemBench: Towards More Comprehensive Evaluation on the Memory of LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.21605/) (2025)
- [MemOS: An Operating System for Memory-Augmented Generation (MAG) in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22101/) (2025)
- [PersistBench: When Should Long-Term Memories Be Forgotten by LLMs?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.01146/) (2026)
- [When Personalization Legitimizes Risks: Uncovering Safety Vulnerabilities in Personalized Dialogue Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.17887/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100% under pooled same-team retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100% top-k placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of +0.416 to +0.511 under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet~4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4~ms per query.