# EvoRiskBench: An Evolving Benchmark for Runtime Security Risks in Workspace Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03153 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.03153/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 21 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Oct 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 21 of 21)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06770/) (2023)
- [A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.11432/) (2023)
- [τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12045/) (2024)
- [AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03688/) (2023)
- [Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.15817/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [AndroidWorld: A Dynamic Benchmarking Environment for Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.14573/) (2024)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.18575/) (2025)
- [SWE-bench Goes Live!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23419/) (2025)
- [OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06134/) (2025)
- [AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.02947/) (2026)
- [AgentCanary: A Security Evaluation Framework for Autonomous AI Agents in Real Executable Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10484/) (2026)
- [A Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.23338/) (2026)
- [Dynamic Risk Assessments for Offensive Cybersecurity Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.18384/) (2025)
- [Safety Testing LLM Agents at Scale: From Risk Discovery to Evidence-Grounded Verification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.01793/) (2026)
- [Taxonomy and Consistency Analysis of Safety Benchmarks for AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.16282/) (2026)
- [AgentS4D: Benchmarking Runtime Risks across the Execution Lifecycle of LLM-Based Workspace Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.27294/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Workspace agents combine large language models with execution harnesses to perform stateful, multi-step tasks that access or modify external resources. Existing benchmarks leave gaps in executable coverage of their runtime security risks, while evolving model capabilities, harnesses, tools, and threats motivate benchmark evolution. We introduce EvoRiskBench, an evolving benchmark organized around the EP-Path-EF framework, which links an initial risk entry point to a one-hop technical effect through an agent-mediated risk path. The framework defines nine entry-point categories and five effect categories; a 20-participant study supports their interpretability and classification consistency on representative cases. Guided by this framework, an automated end-to-end workflow constructs and executes risk cases in isolated environments and independently verifies outcomes using runtime traces and environment states. The benchmark provides a reproducible dataset of 450 adversarial tasks across six scenarios. We evaluate nine model-harness configurations spanning three models (GPT-5.6 Sol, DeepSeek-V4-Pro-0813, and Claude Opus 5) and three harnesses (Claude Code, Codex, and OpenClaw). Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities across systems. The most vulnerable configuration, Codex with DeepSeek-V4-Pro-0813, reaches a 68.44% attack success rate (ASR), indicating that configuration of workspace agent is insufficient to ensure secure autonomous execution. ASR varies more across models than harnesses, and harness differences depend on the model. The benchmark cases and evaluation platform will be released after completion of artifact safety and reproducibility checks.