# DecoyTrace: Toxic Decoys for Active Defense in Decentralized Federated Learning

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36330 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.36330/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 12 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 28 Sep 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.07747/) (2017)
- [Federated Learning with Non-IID Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.00582/) (2018)
- [Measuring the Effects of Non-Identical Data Distribution for Federated Visual Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.06335/) (2019)
- [Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01498/) (2018)
- [Decentralized Federated Learning: Fundamentals, State of the Art, Frameworks, Trends, and Challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.08413/) (2022)
- [FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.09209/) (2022)
- [Byzantine-Robust Decentralized Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.10416/) (2024)
- [FedGT: Identification of Malicious Clients in Federated Learning with Secure Aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.05506/) (2023)
- [Toward Malicious Clients Detection in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09110/) (2025)
- [Tackling Cyberattacks through AI-based Reactive Systems: A Holistic Review and Future Vision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06229/) (2023)
- [Chaotic Encryption Scheme Using 1-D Chaotic Map](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.4042/) (2013)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) eliminates the central aggregation server, reducing the single point of observation that traditional defenses against attacks rely on. As a result, peer-to-peer networks become exposed to malicious updates containing backdoors or semantic poisoning, since such updates can remain close to benign ones in the parameter space while behaving very differently. This may evade defenses based on passive parameter inspection. However, existing deception-based defenses have mainly been designed for centralized FL and do not jointly address local observation, poisoning propagation, source attribution, and containment in strictly serverless DFL. To address these limitations, this paper presents DecoyTrace, a proactive cyber deception-based defense for strictly serverless DFL environments. DecoyTrace deploys a mobile DecoyNode that generates decoy challenges using chaotic maps, disseminates a dual model (clean vs. decoy) based on neighbor trust, and evaluates them using three-state semantic metrics. Upon confirmation, a distributed protocol isolates the source and performs a model reset or recovery to preserve training progress. Evaluated across sixty configurations on the NEBULA platform (five datasets, three topologies, and four attack/defense scenarios), DecoyTrace systematically restores lost utility. The F1-score remains within 0.03 of the baseline on MNIST/FashionMNIST (mitigating drops of up to 0.37), matches or exceeds the baseline on EMNIST and CIFAR-100, and remains between 0.05 and 0.10 below the baseline on CIFAR-10, the most visually complex convolutional scenario evaluated. Furthermore, containment reduces CPU and network usage by up to two-thirds. These results demonstrate the feasibility of unifying deception, identification, and containment in DFL, while also identifying its limitations in complex tasks and multi-attractor threat models.