# What Drives Dialectal Jailbreaks? An Ablation of Surface Form, Cultural Framing, and Strategy Banks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31664 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.31664/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 12 of its 25 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/safety/safety-alignment-refusal-and-guardrails/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.11462/) (2020)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [The State and Fate of Linguistic Diversity and Inclusion in the NLP World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.09095/) (2020)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Cipher](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.06463/) (2023)
- [Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02446/) (2023)
- [Obscure but Effective: Classical Chinese Jailbreak Prompt Optimization via Bio-Inspired Search](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.22983/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recent work suggests that obscure language registers can weaken large language model refusal behavior, especially when paired with black-box prompt optimization. It remains unclear whether failures stem from non-standard surface form, culturally grounded framing, or optimization over an expressive prompt-strategy space. We study Chinese registers by extending a classical-Chinese red-teaming framework to Shanghainese and Cantonese and running a 36-cell ablation across surface forms, strategy-bank variants, and two target models. The main finding is corrective: dialectal surface form is neither necessary nor sufficient for high attack success. Non-optimized English, Mandarin, and naive dialect translations remain below 8% attack success rate, whereas all conditions that retain an optimizer-controlled strategy bank reach 98--100%. A culture-neutral generic strategy bank reaches the same ceiling at near-single-query cost, further indicating that strategy-bank expressiveness, rather than dialectal or cultural content, accounts for most of the observed effect. Dialect choice still affects query efficiency and response severity, and qualitative coding identifies recurring high-level mechanisms such as semantic glossing and procedural scaffolding. We qualify the absolute ceiling-level attack success rate by showing sensitivity to judge calibration and noting that the design does not fully separate one-shot strategy construction from iterative search.