# Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting with Ranked Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30555 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.30555/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 21 of its 34 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 24 Sep 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 21 of 21)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.10271/) (2024)
- [Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1407.8269/) (2014)
- [Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.01795/) (2020)
- [Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.13276/) (2020)
- [Proportional Justified Representation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.09928/) (2016)
- [Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.01989/) (2023)
- [Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.14858/) (2023)
- [Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.04417/) (2023)
- [Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.13637/) (2024)
- [Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14593/) (2024)
- [Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.11017/) (2024)
- [Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.05949/) (2025)
- [Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22513/) (2025)
- [Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.08810/) (2025)
- [The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1701.08023/) (2017)
- [The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.11157/) (2026)
- [Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.19689/) (2024)
- [Online Temporal Voting: Strategyproofness, Proportionality and Asymptotic Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.26504/) (2026)
- [Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.11500/) (2026)
- [Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna: Tractable Settings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.20033/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study proportional representation in temporal voting, where one candidate is selected in each round. While prior work has focused on approval ballots, we consider ranked preferences, which may change over time. A natural approach treats each voter's top candidates as approved, but the right cutoff may differ across voters and rounds. We therefore require proportionality to hold for every admissible choice of cutoffs, whether fixed and common, common but varying across rounds, or set individually for each voter in each round. Combining these interpretations with temporal versions of justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) gives us a hierarchy of axioms. We ask which of these axioms can be guaranteed, and with how much knowledge of the future. Unlike with approval ballots, no version of EJR can be guaranteed, and for the other axioms, flexibility in the cutoffs comes at a price. With a fixed common cutoff, JR, PJR, and PSC can be guaranteed, but only by rules that see all preferences in advance. Once the cutoff may vary across rounds, even such rules cannot guarantee JR or PSC for groups that agree in only some rounds. For groups that agree in every round, however, knowing only the number of rounds suffices for PJR in polynomial time, and PSC needs no knowledge of the future at all. Under individual cutoffs, no version of JR or PJR can be guaranteed, yet a rule as simple as serial dictatorship achieves PJR up to an additive loss that no rule can improve on, however much it knows. Natural preference restrictions restore exact guarantees. Finally, we show that checking our axioms is often coNP-complete; but perhaps surprisingly, a stronger axiom can be easier to check.